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ABSTRACT
The approach used in establishing the predicted aerodynamic uncertainties and the process
used in applying these uncertainties during the design of the Orbiter flight control system and
the entry trajectory is presented. The flight test program that was designed to verify the
stability and control derivatives with a minimum of test flights is presented and a comparison of
preflight predictions with preliminary flight test results is made. It is concluded that the
approach used for the Orbiter is applicable to future programs where testing is limited due to
time constraints or funding.
NOMENCLATURE
A Amplitude, deg/sec or gas
AN Normal acceleration, gas
Ax Axial acceleration, g's
Ay Lateral acceleration, g's
C 
Coefficient of roll due to sideslip,	 per deg
s
C^ Coefficient of roll due	 to aileron deflection,	 per deg
da
CQ Coefficient of roll due to rudder deflection,	 per deg
dr
C Coefficient of yaw due to sideslip,	 per deg
nR
C Coefficient of yaw due to aileron deflection,	 per deg
nd
a
C Coefficient of yaw due to rudder deflection,	 per deg
nd
r
C 
Coefficient of normal force due to elevon deflection, per deg
d
e
C Pitching moment coefficient
m
C Pitching moment coefficient at 0 angle of attack
m
0
C Coefficient of pitching moment due to bodyflap deflection, per deg
m
5 B
C Coefficient of pitching moment due to elevon deflection, 	 per deg
ms
e
C Coefficient of pitching moment due to angle of attack, 	 per deg
m
a
CY Coefficient of side force due to sideslip, per deg
Q
C 
Coefficient of side force due to aileron deflection, 	 per deg
d
a
C 
Coefficient of side force due	 to rudder deflection,	 per deg
d
r
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LB
	Body length, in.
L/D Lift-to-drag ratio
M Mach number
T Time,	 sec
V Velocity,	 ft/sec
X Body axis axial coordinate, 	 in.
Y Body axis lateral coordinate, in.
Z Body axis vertical coordinate, in.
q, Angle of attack, deg
S Sideslip angle, deg
g
a
Aileron deflection, deg
6 B
Bodyflap deflection, 	 deg
d Elevon deflection,	 deg
e
S Rudder deflection,	 deg
r
6 S
Speedbrake deflection, deg
o Standard deviation
q Dynamic pressure, psf
W 
Undamped natural frequency of the dutch roll oscillation
Undamped natural frequency of the numerator of ^/6 a transfer functionw^
ACRONYMS
ACIP Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package
cg Center of gravity
FCS Flight Control System
FSL Flight Software Laboratory
GN&C Guidance, Navigation and Control
GPC General purpose computer
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
LRU Line replaceable unit
MMLE3 Modified maximum likelihood estimator, version 3
MXRCS RCS roll moment
MZRCS RCS yaw moment
POPU Pushover Pullup Maneuver
PTI Programmed test	 input
RCS Reaction control system
SPS Shuttle Procedures Simulator
STS Space Transportation System
STS-1 First Flight of	 the Space Shuttle
STS-2 Second Flight of	 the Space Shuttle
WOW Worse on worse combination of errors
INTRODUCTION
The decision to perform an orbital manned mission on the first Shuttle launch presented
several challenges to the entry design community. A significant challenge was presented by the
question of how to maximize safety (man rate the system) on the first flight considering the
parallel development of the aerodynamics and the Flight Control System (FCS). A challenge was
also presented in setting up a flight test program for a vehicle that was flying through a
continuously changing environment. Finally, because of cost and operational constraints, the
question of how to develop an operational vehicle with a minimum flight test program became a
large challenge. This paper will address how these challenges were successfully met.
AERODYNAMIC VARIATIONS DEVELOPMENT
The challenge of maximizing safety on the first flight led to development of a reasonable
estimate of maximum possible errors in the preflight predicted aerodynamics which were used to
certify the FCS prior to the first flight. The best approach for the development of these errors
which were called variations, was concluded to be an analysis of the wind tunnel to flight test
differences of previous aircraft programs. Unfortunately, the verification of preflight predicted
265
aerodynamics was not a major objective of most of the previous flight test programs. This
severely limited the amount of data available for conducting flight test to wind tunnel
comparisons. The flight data base was further limited by restricting the comparison to those
vehicles which were geometrically similar to the Orbiter. Those vehicles chosen as applicable to
the Orbiter are presented in table 1. Also presented are geometric factors and other
considerations pertinent to the vehicle configuration choices.
Variations were established by fairing the differences between the flight and predicted
aerodynamics as a function of Mach number. The selections of the configurations and the fairing
process are very subjective in nature. For this reason, a team of aerodynamicists from the
various NASA centers, the Air Force and the contractors was formed to conduct the analysis and
reach a consensus on variations.
The team's flight-to-predicted correlation and their recommended variations fairings are
presented in reference 1. A more detailed development is presented in reference 2. The
development of a less severe set of uncertainties (tolerances) based on the repeatability of wind
tunnel tests is also presented in reference 1.
Reaction control jet plume interaction variation development is reviewed in reference 3
THE CORRELATION OF AERODYNAMIC VARIATIONS
A total of 9 lateral directional coefficients (3 each beta, aileron and rudder derivatives)
were defined for application to the Orbiter entry FCS verification. Use of all possible
combination of signs and variations for these 9 coefficients would have resulted in an impossible
number of cases to analyze and simulate. Therefore, considerable attention was devoted to
identifying the more critical combination of coefficient variations for use in FCS verification.
In addition, an alternative to a worse-on-worse (WOW) analysis was desirable to provide a
less demanding and possibly more realistic result for formal verification. The initial step in
reducing the WOW case was to define any sign correlation that might exist between coefficient
variations based on the physical relation of the coefficients.
Reference 4 presents the details involved in defining the correlation coefficients.
Correlations were established for the sideslip, aileron and rudder derivatives. For the
correlated coefficients, 99 percentile ellipses were established from the equation
1 = (1 - P ) -1 {( X ) 2 - 2P ( X ) ( Y ) + ( Y ) 2 .
xy	 11 3ax	xy 3a  3a 	 Say
X and Y are the correlated coefficients, a and a are the standard deviations and p 	 is the
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linear correlation coefficient which varies between zero and one. Stated from a probability
standpoint there is a one chance in a hundred that a combination of errors in X and Y would lie
outside the locus of the 99 percentile ellipse.
Figure 1 presents an example of correlations in the yawing moment and rolling moment sideslip
coefficients. The vector from the origin represents the nominal value for C n and C^ while the
s	 s
rectangle represents the 3a variations. The different ellipses inside the rectangle show the
effect of varying the correlation from 0 to a highly correlated value of .9. Results from wind
tunnel tests were used to establish the correlation coefficients.
APPLICATION OF AERODYNAMIC VARIATIONS
A programmatic decision was made to use aerodynamic variations in the Orbiter FCS design
evaluation and verification process. For the initial FCS design evaluation and simulation
studies, a "worst on worst" combination of variations was used. For the formal entry verification
at the Flight Software Laboratory (FSL) at Rockwell, variation sets were used which correlated the
roll and yaw moment coefficients for the sideslip, aileron and rudder coefficients.
Because of the wide range of flight conditions the Orbiter was to encounter during the first
reentry flight test, it was required to evaluate as many combinations of aerodynamic uncertainties
as possible. However it was also desirable to select a more limited set of uncertainties for
concentrated analysis and simulation efforts. It thus became necessary to define those
aerodynamic uncertainty combinations that presented the most potential problems to the Orbiter and
to make certain that the flight control system could maintain control of the Orbiter with these
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combinations. In the initial FCS evaluation, a total of 26 lateral directional variation sets
were evaluated in a series of almost 600 piloted simulation runs on the Shuttle Procedures
Simulator (SPS) at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). These 26 cases were selected using various
trim, controllability and handling qualities criteria. Based on the results of these simulation
runs plus additional trim and stability analyses, a subset of 7 cases were chosen and used for the
majority of the formal verification process.
Figure 2 shows a vector diagram of the aero coefficients and RCS jets for the roll and yaw
axes at Mach 3.5. The numbers shown on the diagram indicate the nomenclature used for identifying
the 7 cases selected for the verification process. The corners shown indicate the WOW or
"rectangular" variation sets which were used in the FCS development while the ellipses represent
the correlated variations. The elliptical variation sets were generally selected from points on
the ellipses that were close to the rectangular counterparts. Some of the history and logic
involved in the selection of the cases used for the FCS verification will now be discussed.
LCDP AND Cn DYNAMIC
Q
A significant portion of the analysis devoted to aerodynamic variations was applied to
variation sets 19 and 20. Variation set 19 represented the most severe case for the Lateral
Control Departure Parameter (LCDP). 5 During the early stages of the Orbiter development, most of
the reentry was performed using an all aerodynamic control concept. Prior to rudder activation
which then occurred around Mach 5, the aileron was the only aerodynamic control effector for
lateral directional control and trim. A reverse aileron control that required a negative value
	
for the LCDP, C C^	 - C^ Cn	< 0, was utilized prior to rudder activation. 6 The lateral trim
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logic was also configured so that a negative value of the LCDP was required prior to rudder
activation. Some of the early simulations using aerodynamic uncertainties on the aileron and beta
derivatives resulted in lateral trim and controllability problems prior to rudder activation.
Analysis indicated that the problem was caused by a sign change in the LCDP in the Mach 5 region.
As a partial result of this problem, several changes were made to the FCS. The basic FCS design
was changed from the aileron bank control to a system utilizing the yaw RCS jets to initiate bank
maneuvers and the ailerons to coordinate the maneuvers prior to activation of the rudder. 7 After
the rudder became active, a gradual FCS gain change produced the conventional aileron bank control
with rudder coordination.
Since use of the yaw jets for trim would result in excessive propellant requirements, the
aileron was still required for trim. To improve the aileron trim capability in the critical Mach
region, changes were made to the angle of attack and elevon schedules. With aero variations
applied, Mach 3.5 was the highest Mach number that the rudder could be considered effective and
this Mach number was chosen as the activation point for the rudder. It was then considered a
requirement that aileron trim be available down to Mach 3.5 with minimal yaw RCS requirements.
Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of the Orbiter LCDP to angle of attack for several Mach
numbers with the worst case aero variations applied. It is obvious that in the Mach greater than
3 region an angle of attack of more then 15 0 is desirable in order to maintain a negative LCDP.
The early flights of the Orbiter were tailored so that the angle of attack remained above 15 0 for
Mach greater than 3.5.
Another significant factor in the LCDP is the elevon trim position. This is due to the
effect of elevon position on the aileron derivatives. A desired elevon trim position of +50
(down) was eventually selected for STS-1 in the Mach 3-4 region. In the higher Mach region where
elevon heating is a concern, the elevon was scheduled at -1 degree (up) and in the transonic
region where there was some concern about hinge moments, a schedule close to zero was selected.
The elevon position is maintained by the bodyflap through a feedback from the elevon which drives
the bodyflap to maintain the pre-set elevon schedule.
Application of the LCDP in the Mach range from approximately 3-8 was a driver in the angle of
attack, elevon and speedbrake schedules as well as the longitudinal cg choice for STS-1.
In the longitudinal axis the primary problem associated with aero uncertainties was the
pitching moment uncertainty, Cm and its effect on elevon trim position. Figure 4 shows the pre
0
STS-1 capability to position the elevon for the design cg body length extremes of 65 percent
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(forward) and 67.5 percent (aft) with pitching moment variations and with the bodyflap positioned
at its extreme limits to aid the desired trim. Also shown on figure 4 is the STS-1 elevon
schedule. It is obvious that with C variations the Orbiter could not achieve the desired elevonM
schedule over the design range of cg's. Based on the desired elevon schedule and the effect of
pitching moment variations, the STS-1 cg was selected at 66.7 percent body length. Figure 5 shows
the elevon envelope at the 66.7 percent cg with C m variations while figure 6 shows the effect of
cg on the LCDP at Mach 3.5 for the worst case variation set. The cg envelope adopted for STS-1
mission rules is shown in figure 7.
Variation set 20 created the minimum value for C
n	 n
dynamic which is defined as C cosa -Q	 Q
I
C Q sina Iz . C n dynamic is the stability term for coupled lateral directional motion and it was
Q	 x	 Q
considered a requirement to have a stable value for this parameter throughout entry. Figure 8
shows C	 dynamic in the lower Mach region for variation set 20 for lg flight at 7.5 0 a. The
nQ
unaugmented C	 dynamic is unstable from about Mach 1.2 to 3.2 at these flight conditions.
nQ
The Orbiter FCS utilizes a side acceleration feedback to the rudder and yaw jets to provide
stability augmentation. An approximate Q feedback gain to the rudder can be computed and from
this gain a rudder "augmented C n dynamic" can be calculated. For the Mach 2 region the
Q
equivalent gain for Q feedback to the rudder is approximately -1.5 to -2. Additional augmentation
is provided by the yaw RCS jets and although the system is nonlinear, an approximation to an
augmented C	 dynamic can be obtained which is valid for sideslip angles less than that required
nQ
to fire all 4 jets (approximately 1 0 to 20 ). The effective Cn 
Q 
dynamic for both rudder and RCS
augmentation is shown in figure 8. Very little improvement is shown for the rudder augmentation.
This is due to the small rudder effectiveness which results from the aeroelasticity effects and
from application of aerodynamic variations. It is evident that the RCS provides a significant
improvement. However after the jets are saturated additional augmentation is not available and
there is a Q limit beyond which control is not possible. For STS-1, angle of attack and dynamic
pressure limits were established based on the ability of 2 yaw jets to control the Orbiter at 1.50
sideslip for the worst case aero variations. Figure 9 shows the lower angle of attack boundary
established for the flight rules based on lateral trim concerns above Mach 3 and C n dynamic
Q
concerns below Mach 3. In the Mach 2 region STS-1 had a dynamic pressure limit of 250 psf
programmed into the guidance laws and the trajectory was shaped to provide ample margin above the
lower alpha limits.
ADDITIONAL CRITERIA
While the aero variation sets associated with the LCDP and with C n dynamic received
Q
considerable attention during the FCS design and verification process, other combinations of
variations shown on figure 2 were also extensively analyzed. Diagrams similar to figure 2 were
widely used in helping to select which variation sets to use at different flight conditions. This
was particularly true of cases involving co-alignment of effectors and stability derivatives. For
example, with the variation set 19, the beta and aileron vectors align which corresponds to the
LCDP going to zero. This results in the loss of aerodynamic lateral trim capability and would
require the use of yaw jets to trim. Variation set 19 was used for the worst case LCDP analysis.
Variation set 20 was used for the minimum C nQ dynamic case and results in both minimum Q stability
and rudder effectiveness. Variation set 20 resulted in another problem at higher Mach numbers
which required a change to the FCS. At the hypersonic Mach numbers and 40 0 angle of attack when
variations were applied to 1 yaw jet, a coalignment of the jet and Q vectors occurred due to a
counter clockwise rotation of the jet vector. Since the bank control is achieved through the
combination of jets and Q, a control criteria similar to the LCDP results. The form of this
criteria used for the Orbiter was C n MX	- CQ MZ	> 0. With one yaw jet firing a control
Q RCS	 Q RCS
reversal resulted which was similar to the case for the aileron control problem associated with
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the LCDP. As a result of this problem, the FCS was changed so that a minimum of two yaw jets were
always fired. Another case that received considerable attention was variation set 12 which is a
high gain case utilizing the most stable sideslip derivatives in combination with the most
effective control surfaces and jets. This case provided a balance for the low gnin cases and
resulted in FCS gains that covered the potential extremes in the aero variations. Case 9 was
similar to case 20, but in the presence of large winds around Mach 5, a long period oscillation
was observed under certain flight conditions. Offline stability analysis indicated the more
negative Cn
S 
associated with variation set 9 was resulting in a system approaching neutral
A
stability.
In general cases 2, 11, and 23 produced less severe problems than the previously mentioned
cases and were eventually dropped from the formal verification for STS-2. Case 2 was originally
selected because it produced the largest value for (w^/w d ) 2 and there was some concern about
creating pilot induced oscillations ( PIO) with this set of variations. However, there was no
indication in any of the piloted simulations that this case produced any PIO tendencies. Case 11
was originally selected because it was thought to give the minimum value of the LCDP for the
conventional aileron control mode. However, in the critical Mach region around Mach 2, case 9
usually resulted in a lower value of the LCDP. Case 23 was selected because it generated a
maximum sideslip angle during the high heating region.
A problem that was observed with cases 9, 11 and 23 was an occasional tendency for the
aileron and rudder to trim against each other after the rudder became active. From figure 2 it
can be observed that the aileron and rudder vectors are almost co -aligned for these cases and is
the probable cause for the trim problem. A procedure was utilized for STS-1 which required the
crew to check the trim after the rudder became active and to trim the aileron back toward zero if
a force fight resulted between the aileron and rudder.
FCS VERIFICATION PROCESS
The 570 piloted simulated runs on the Shuttle Procedures Simulation at JSC were completed in
December 1977 and uncovered several significant problems when the variation sets were applied.
Several changes were made to the FCS and another series of simulations were made in April and May
of 1978. The modified FCS was able to maintain control of all combinations of aerodynamic
variations except for one case in the Mach 6 region. This problem occurred when a variation set
with minimum values of C 	 dynamic was combined with large winds resulting in errors in the
Q
navigation derived angle of attack. Because angle of attack terms are present in the bank
coordination logic of the FCS, errors in the angle of attack result in miscoordination during bank
maneuvers and a resulting buildup in sideslip angle. If RCS jet failures occurred, control
problems resulted for angle of attack errors greater than approximately 3 0 . In order to
accommodate this problem the flight rules for the early flights required manual bank reversals at
reduced roll rates in the Mach 6 region if RCS jet failures occurred.
The formal integrated guidance, navigation and control ( GNhC) verification testing began at
the FSL in September 1979. A total of 35 runs were made before the simulation was suspended due
to several significant problems that resulted. Forty-one flight software anomalies were
identified of which 21 were related to the FCS. In general the problems occurring on the FSL had
not been observed in the non integrated FCS simulations or were of a much smaller magnitude. As a
result of the FSL results extensive analysis of the FCS was done to attempt to identify and
correct the observed anomalies. The launch schedule slip due to the loose tile problem provided
the FCS community an opportunity to perform a major review of the FCS design. Some of the
problems were related to excessively large uncertainties applied to the GN&C line replaceable
units ( LRU) and some related to the FSL models. However some FCS changes were required to handle
the aero variations and the Orbiter Software Control Board approved the change requests in April
1980.
Figure 10 shows the test matrix that was proposed for the final FCS verification. 8 The matrix
includes aerodynamic uncertainties, winds, and tolerances on the GN&C LRU"s. Most of the
simulation runs were performed using the upper left box (nominal) and the lower right box (worst
case). Figure 11 outlines the verification process that was approved by the Orbiter
Configuration Control Board ( CCB) prior to the final integrated verification testing at the FSL.8
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The GN&C first was tested with nominal aerodynamics and then with the variations. If no
problems occurred with worst case variations, verification was considered complete. If problems
resulted with variations, the case was repeated with tolerances. If the system could not handle
tolerances, a design change was required and the process repeated. A case that passed with
tolerances but failed with variations resulted in a review with the aero group to discuss the
validity of the specific variation case. The problem was then presented to the CCB who made the
decision to either accept the risk associated with the case or to require a design change.
Formal verification was done on the FSL in August and September of 1980. The GN&C
performance was greatly improved compared to the previous verification runs. A week long post
simulation review by personnel from Rockwell, Honeywell, and JSC was conducted to thoroughly
analyze the results of each run. A total of 16 anomalies were identified, but most of these were
relatively minor and required no substantive action. The most significant problems were
associated with the low C 	 dynamic cases in the presence of design case winds around Mach 5. The
Q
program managers eventually accepted these cases after it was shown that the design winds for the
STS-1 flight date of April resulted in less severe problems than the worst case winds used for the
FSL verification. The flight rule requiring manual bank maneuvers in this Mach region following
RCS jet failures also tended to alleviate the problem. Based on the results of the verification
process the GN&C community had a high degree of confidence as the Orbiter entered the flight test
program.
FLIGHT TESTING CHALLENGE
Stability and control testing of the Space Shuttle is driven by conflicting program desires,
while limited by unique problems. Space Shuttle flights are very costly when compared with test
flights of other aircraft. There is an intense desire within the program to bring the Shuttle to
an operational mode, where payloads can begin to make the Shuttle cost effective. On the other
hand it is important to assure the safety of entry flight and to identify the real limitations of
the Shuttle through flight testing. This conflict in goals has resulted in the need for a minimum
amount of highly productive testing.
Conventional flight test techniques and computer programs have formed the basis for the
Shuttle flight test program. Modifications to these techniques have been necessary, however, due
to the inherent constraints in Shuttle testing. Measures have been taken to ensure the quality of
maneuvers and the data from them, so that the number of repeat maneuvers can be minimized.
The flight test plan developed for the Shuttle contains very few test points when compared to
test programs of military aircraft. Enough maneuvers are scheduled only to verify the safety of
the Shuttle entry; not enough to build a flight test data base. Where significant differences
exist between the flight data and the wind tunnel data base, further test points are scheduled.
The stability and control derivatives are obtained from the onboard sensor data through the
MMLE3 parameter identification program. 9 This program was developed at Dryden Flight Research
Facility and is a state-of-the-art method of extracting derivatives from flight data. MMLE3 is
the latest version of a program which has been used in many test programs for all types of
aircraft.
Derivative deltas calculated between flight and values from the Shuttle Aerodynamic Design
Data Book 10 are provided to Shuttle simulators to demonstrate the safety of further testing on
upcoming flights and to assure the safety of flying cg's associated with planned payloads.
TEST REQUIREMENTS
Aerodynamic test requirements have arisen from two sources. The original source is the
preflight wind tunnel data and the associated aerodynamic variations. The other source of
requirements is the flight data from the initial flights, during which anomalies occurred. The
types of problems identified involve either potentially excessive RCS fuel usage for longitudinal
and lateral trim, or potential loss of control.
PREFLIGHT TEST REQUIREMENTS
Preflight wind tunnel data for the Orbiter is very extensive and coupled with the FCS
verification process provided sufficient confidence to fly the initial missions under benign
11
conditions and within a limited range of x cg 	 However, at the cg extremes, analysis indicated
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combinations of uncertainties in pitching moment and the stability and control derivatives
resulted in potential control problems. These potential problems resulted in the establishement
of the entry flight placards on angle of attack, dynamic pressure and x cg mentioned previously.
Figure 12 shows the preflight areas of concern identified on a typical Mach-alpha profile.
From entry interface to a dynamic pressure of 20 lbs per sq ft, uncertainties in basic
pitching moment and in pitch jet, bodyflap, and elevon effectiveness indicated a possible problem
in longitudinal trim at the cg extremes. Such a trim problem would result in excessive use of RCS
fuel by the pitch jets.
From Mach 7 to 3, uncertainty in the LCDP was the primary concern. Since the LCDP changes
signs in this Mach region, the FCS gains were designed to provide a transition from a mode
requiring a negative LCDP to a conventional aircraft control mode requiring a positive LCDP.
Since the exact location of the sign change in the LCDP is unknown there is a requirement for
identifying the aerodynamic coefficients in the LCDP and determining the effects of the elevon and
cg position on these coefficients.
In the region from Mach 3 to 1, C 
n 
dynamic was a concern, particularly for trajectories
s
resulting in large dynamic pressures. C	 dynamic was also a concern in the Mach 5-8 region for
na
high wind cases that produced an error in the navigation derived angle of attack. After the
rudder becomes active at Mach 3.5, the combined lateral trim characteristics of the aileron and
rudder were of particular interest.
Flight testing is planned between Mach numbers of .9 and .75 due to reduced rudder
effectiveness at minimum speedbrake settings. The rudder is aft of the maximum thickness point on
the vertical tail, and effects of the flow past the rudder panels become less certain with a
closed speedbrake.
FLIGHT TEST REQUIREMENTS FROM FLIGHT DATA
Anomalies in the actual flight data have extended the test requirements as originally
conceived. These anomalies have in some cases accentuated the need for certain data already in
the flight test plan. Others have pointed to a need for more concentrated investigation of
certain flight regimes. A summary of flight anomalies are shown in figure 12, items 1 through 7.
During the initial bank maneuver on flight 1, at a dynamic pressure of 14 lbs per sq ft, a
large oscillation occurred in sideslip. Studies have indicated that the primary cause was a
missed prediction in roll due to yaw jet firing. 12
Another flight anomaly is a longitudinal trim difference from what was predicted. This
occurs both in the hypersonic regime with a pitch up difference and in the transonic regime, where
the difference is a pitch down moment. 12 Because the pitching moment anomaly causes more up (-)
elevon trim transonically, the aileron effectiveness data required in this regime has become even
more important. The hypersonic anomaly has caused an increased need for longitudinal stability
and control data to ascertain the contributions of C m , Cm	, Cm , and Cm
 to this problem.
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Figure 13 indicates the range of elevon settings required for trim based on attributing the
pitching moment difference to Cm alone.
0
Causing additional interest in the Mach 2 to 1 regime is an anomaly which has been observed
on the first five flights. The anomaly is in the form of an undamped low amplitude roll
oscillation, which has a frequency of approximately 1/4 hertz. This problem has not resulted in
additional test requirements, since intensive testing is already planned for this regime. 12
Additional stability and control testing in the hypersonic regime has resulted from STS-1
data. These data indicated that lateral stability was different than expected. Specifically C 
a
1413,
was more (+) than expected. 11,	 In addition, aileron trim was observed to have an offset
between Mach 18 and 7. This offset has been observed to change signs, indicating possible flow
asymmetries.
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Another important anomaly has occurred hypersonically. Above Mach 10, where the elevon
schedule has been varied between -1 and +5 on flights 1-4, the flight data indicate that the
aileron is more effective than predicted at positive elevon deflections. The data also indicate
the effectiveness to be close to nominal at O o elevon setting. While this is beneficial for
positive deflections, the trend indicates that the aileron may be less effective at negative
deflections. This accentuates the need for data which will clarify the dependence of aileron on
elevon deflection.
These anomalies have not restricted the flight placards further. However, they have
emphasized the need for data in certain flight regimes. They have also caused the planning of
further testing in specific areas.
SHUTTLE FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
The Shuttle test program is the product of significant planning and integration with other
program requirements. The flight test requirements from wind tunnel uncertainties and flight
anomalies dictated the flight conditions at which maneuvers would be done. Sufficient maneuvers
were planned at nominal conditions to indicate repeatability of results. Additional maneuvers
were planned over the ranges of elevon and angle of attack that will be seen operationally to
check coefficient sensitivities to these parameters. The test plan has been modified to provide
additional information in areas where anomalies have occurred. This is necessary to establish an
understanding of the anomaly and to develop a data base for simulators in areas where the wind
tunnel data is deficient.
The tests planned for each flight are limited by the nature of the Shuttle entry and by other
program requirements. Only one maneuver at each flight condition is possible on a given flight,
since the Shuttle glides from 400,000 ft in altitude at Mach 25 to touchdown in the span of 30
minutes. The crew has monitoring functions and other tasks during entry that also limit the
number of maneuvers that can be performed. This has resulted in a limit of 8 to 10 maneuvers per
flight and in a ground rule which requires that maneuvers be spaced to the satisfaction of the
flight crew. Another limitation is the amount of RCS fuel available for doing maneuvers. Entry
tests must compete in priority with other mission objectives for RCS fuel. This includes on-orbit
activities such as rendezvous tests and payload deployment. Other entry tests such as structural
flutter tests and aerothermal pushover pullup test maneuvers (POPU) have taken priority over
stability and control maneuvers, because instrumentation for these tests were available on flights
1-5 only. When a conflict occurs, guidance maneuvers and guidance phase changes take priority
over test maneuvers.
The flight testing has been planned to meet program objectives. The first and most important
is to open the cg placards as quickly as possible in order to verify the safety of flying planned
payloads. In addition, data resulting from tests are scheduled to support planned flight control
system changes which will improve control where in-flight aerodynamic anomalies have occurred.
SENSOR DATA FOR TESTING
Sensor data used in stability and control analysis is obtained from two basic sources. The
primary source of data is the aerodynamic coefficient identification package (ACIP), which is
located in the wing carry-through structure. It was designed specifically for aerodynamic data
extraction. The other source is the onboard data system, which provides real-time data for the
guidance and flight control systems. The ACIP is a high quality data package recording data at
173 samples per second utilizing a 14 bit system. The onboard data system records data at 5 and
25 samples per second using an 8 bit system. A more detailed explanation of the sensor data is
given in reference 12.
STABILITY AND CONTROL MANEVUERS
Maneuvers for stability and control data have been carefully developed to provide the maximum
amount of information possible. It is important in this testing to excite the motion defined by
the derivatives in question, so as to identify them from the flight data. Because of the limited
testing of the Shuttle and the characteristics of the flight control system, precise maneuver
design and execution are very important. Poorly performed maneuvers can be costly to the program
in the form of further required testing.
The flight control system of the Shuttle heavily modifies inputs through the stick and is
designed to damp oscillations and transients. This design causes difficulty in pulsing a control
effector ind allowing motion to damp as is done with most aircraft. In pulsing the Shuttle, the
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control system modifies the stick input with filters, responds to rate and acceleration feedback
values, and damps the response with further surface motion. In general, when the vehicle is
pulsed, all control effectors available are put into action to quickly damp the vehicle motion.
This can cause difficulty in separating out the effectiveness of the various control effectors.
It makes it difficult to accurately identify damping derivatives.
To overcome this important problem and to provide exact designed inputs, programmed test
inputs (PTI) were developed. This type of maneuver is input directly to the flight control system
through onboard software. The amplitude and timing is governed by programmed variables to
generate a specific input at a predesignated flight condition.
The crew involvement in the maneuvers is almost entirely a monitoring function. The maneuver
sequencing is initiated by the crew before the first maneuver, and the software automatically
executes the predefined maneuvers within specified windows. These windows are defined by dynamic
pressure or Mach number. The software avoids executing maneuvers close to bank reversals and
other guidance phase changes. The crew monitors trajectory and trim parameters and important
entry flight systems to assure safe maneuver conditions. The crew can quickly stop the maneuver
sequence by moving the stick or selecting the control stick steering (CSS) mode. They have full
visibility into the testing status through items on their displays.
The inputs are made through the flight control system, and go to an integrator at the point
where the surface deflection is commanded. The input is added to the current command. The
command, a surface rate, is then processed through a maximum rate limit function. Signals can be
sent to the elevon, aileron, rudder, and pitch, yaw, and roll jets. Because of the direct input
capability, maneuvers are input in the automatic guidance mode. The input is in the form of a
doublet. The doublet commands surface rate in one direction and then the opposite direction
resulting in a pulse from the control effector. These doublets can be strung together in
combinations to provide various inputs from each of the control effectors. There is a capability
to define 25 PTI windows, and there are 45 doublets that can be grouped in the windows as desired.
The input from the automatic PTI is not completely free of flight control system
interference, but the design does allow for enhanced maneuvers. An example of a maneuver for Mach
5.8 is illustrated in figure 14. The inputs are defined by amplitudes, times, and the effector to
be pulsed. The flight control system continues to respond to the motion feedback, but direct
input can be made to the control effector. In this example it is possible to make the aileron
input while there are no yaw jet firings.
Direct input to the surfaces in a "bare airframe" sense is not possible in the program at
present. With the basic lack of stability of the Shuttle, it would not be safe to maneuver the
vehicle without an active control system. The automatic PTI design offers the most feasible
alternative that is available.
Maneuvers, once designed for the optimum motion for data extraction, are assessed for flight
control and guidance safety. Although potential problem areas are approached carefully, care must
be taken in maneuvering not to excite an undamped or diverging oscillation. It is also important
not to perturb the trajectory so as to disturb the ranging capability during the Shuttle's gliding
descent.
Maneuvers are studied extensively for flight control safety. Both off-line and real-time
simulators are used to study maneuvers with worst case aerodynamic uncertainty combinations.
Maneuver amplitudes are increased to assess safety margins. Loss of RCS jets is also simulated.
Flight test aerodynamic results are fed through this same process to verify maneuver safety
margins with data that is the best possible representation of actual Shuttle characteristics.
Maneuver guidance impacts and entry timeline conflicts are assessed in a similar manner.
Simulations are run to determine conflicts between stability and control maneuvers and guidance
maneuvers and phase changes. Shuttle pilots assess maneuver conflicts with other important pilot
functions. If conflicts arise from these studies, maneuver windows are adjusted or are deleted.
In general the short, low amplitude, PTI maneuvers have a negligible impact on guidance
capability, but they are studied nonetheless. When combined with other maneuver sequences,
guidance impacts can occur. RCS jet fuel budgets for maneuvers are developed during these
simulations to provide the pilots with fuel "red lines" that must not be violated, in order to
continue initiating maneuvers. Usage of RCS fuel during maneuvers is significant. Loss of
vehicle control is possible if the RCS fuel is depleted.
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SHUTTLE MANEUVER TEST PLAN
The maneuvers planned or already flown on each flight are listed in figure 15. The left hand
column lists the flight conditions at which the tests are planned. The other columns are labeled
by flight number. Flight one had no planned maneuvers other than bank reversals required for
ranging. The first entry was designed to be as benign as possible. Flight 2 had 25 maneuvers,
including pitch and roll maneuvers for stability and control data, a pushover pullup maneuver, and
bodyflap pulses. Subsequent to STS-2, decisions were made to reduce the number of maneuvers per
flight so as to decrease crew workload during entry. As a result fewer maneuvers are shown on
flights 3-17. The test program has therefore evolved from an initial 10 flights into a 17 flight
program in order to obtain sufficient data. It can be observed in figure 15 that the most
concentrated testing is from Mach 6 to .9. This is because it is the most critical regime with
respect to potential problems in stability and control.
The test plan for stability and control data is designed to provide sufficient information to
remove forward and aft cg constraints. The forward center of gravity travel is limited primarily
by aileron characteristics at negative elevon settings. To verify the aileron characteristics
before flying a forward cg, the vehicle trim of a forward cg is simulated by appropriate
scheduling of the elevon. Elevon schedules for flights 1-17 are shown in figure 16 with the
locations of the maneuvers from figure 15 superimposed. The schedules cover the range of expected
values for the full range of cgs. These elevon schedules are attained during flight by onboard
software programming of the elevon settings. The bodyflap is used to trim the vehicle at the
given setting. The schedule shown for flight 2 is the most benign schedule and provides the most
positive aileron control between Mach 6 to 1. As the flights progress and more data is obtained,
the elevons are to be scheduled gradually more up (-) until the most forward cg is simulated on
flights 14-17. Hypersonically, the elevon is being trimmed beyond what is required during normal
entry for a forward cg (figure 13). This is due to the data already obtained which indicated
anomalous aileron effectiveness as a function of elevon position. The settings shown on flights
14 to 17 should shed additional light on this problem and the results can be used to assess
certain abort profiles which use more negative elevon positions for trim.
Angle of attack will be varied on a limited number of flights. Figure 17 illustrates the
nominal angle of attack profiles to be flown on particular flights. Maneuvers will be executed
along these profiles to verify predicted angle of attack trends in stability and control
parameters. Flights 6, 8, and 12 will be flown with an elevon schedule that has been flown
previously so as to vary only one parameter at a time. Flights 14, 16, and 17 will be flown with
an elevon setting that represents the trim requirements for a forward cg. The symbols represent
where maneuvers will occur along the profile on flights where the profile is off-nominal.
	
Stability derivatives C
	 andC
	
are of particular interest as a function of angle of attack.
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In addition, an understanding of the possibility of aileron effectiveness being a function of the
combined effects of angle of attack and elevon is to be studied. This will require deviations in
both angle of attack and elevon position for various maneuver test points.
Additional factors in the planning will contribute to the necessary understanding of the
stability and control characteristics of the Shuttle. Figure 18 shows speedbrake schedules for
the nominal entry, ana planned schedules for flights 5 through 17. With these different
schedules, rudder sensitivities can be obtained. With the automatic maneuvers beginning on flight
5, a rudder pulse can be input at any point regardless of whether or not the rudder is active in
the flight control system. The rudder normally becomes active at Mach 3.5. With this capability,
the rudder effectiveness will be tested 1/2 Mach number higher per flight, beginning on flight 5
at Mach 4. To obtain further data on possible aerodynamic asymmetric characteristics of the
Shuttle, Ycg offsets are planned through payload placement. Ycg values of .5 to .9 inches have
been flown on flights 4 and 5. A Ycg value of 1.5 inches is planned for flights 7 and 11, with
the sign of the offset reversing between the two flights. Although POPU maneuvers were planned
primarily to obtain aerodynamic performance and aerothermal data, these maneuvers were also a
valuable source of additional longitudinal stability and control data. Bodyflap pulses were flown
only on STS-2. During these maneuvers the crew manually changed bodyflap trim down (+) to move
the elevons up (-). A PTI was then performed. This was to provide early indications of aileron
effectiveness with more (-) elevon settings.
FLIGHT DATA ASSESSMENTS
An important product of the flight test program is the confidence that is gained from flight
test results, in assessing the safety of upcoming flights. Vehicle cgs associated with specific
payloads must be shown to be safe. In addition, further testing in the flight test program
depends on values of derivatives obtained from previous tests. For instance, it is important to
274
understand as much as possible about stability and control characteristics for down elevon
positions, before it is safe to fly with elevons at more negative settings. To accomplish this,
fairings are developed for the flight test results and are provided to the Shuttle flight control
system community. These fairings or "assessment" values are incorporated into simulators which
are used to verify the safety of upcoming flights. Exact maneuvers and trajectory profiles are
simulated with correct cgs. In addition, stability analyses are performed using the flight
derived aerodynamic data to update cg placards for the vehicle.
STS-1 THRU -4 FLIGHT ASSESSMENT VALUES
Flight test results in the form of stability and control derivatives have been output for use
in simulators after flights 1, 2, and 4. Some of the most significant of these derivatives are
shown in figures 19 to 24. These figures show derivative values for various types of maneuvers
from flights 1 to 4. It is important to note that the highest quality maneuvers are the PTI's,
which have darkened symbols. In the plots, pre-flight 1 Aerodynamic Design Data Book values
(solid line) and the associated uncertainties are drawn. The abrupt changes in the data book
values at some locations are due to the data being plotted for the specific flight condition and
configuration where the maneuver was executed and do not represent abrupt nonlinearities in the
data base. The uncertainty brackets on the derivatives are Cramer Rao bounds, which provide
information on the relative accuracy of data extraction between data points. 9 Also drawn on the
plots are the STS-4 assessment values. These assessment values are the fairings that have been
published from flights 1 to 4 for these derivatives.
For C R in figure 19, the flight test values are shown to be significantly more positive than
s
what was predicted above Mach 10. However, this is of no particular concern to the safety of the
Shuttle through this Mach regime. Below Mach 6 the C 	 fairing is shown to be approximately
Q
halfway between nominal and the lower value of the uncertainties. This value of CQ , by itself is
s
not of concern for for Shuttle safety of flight, but if C 	 should become positive for more up
d
a
elevon settings, the more negative C
QQ 
will have an adverse effect on the LCDP.
Aileron effectiveness above Mach 10 is shown for PTI's in figures 20 and 21. These values
are plotted as a function of elevon position. Because of the spread of elevon between flights 1
through 4 in this Mach regime, a difference in the effect of elevon on aileron effectivness has
been discovered. Both Cand C	 indicate increased effectiveness with down elevon
Q 6	 n 
a	 a
deflections. The assessment values for elevon settings above O o were set to nominal, because of
the lack of data. If the trend for positive elevon deflections extend to negative elevon
deflections, the aileron may be less effective than predicted. Although this difference between
predicted and actual aileron effectiveness has little effect on safety hypersonically, the impact
to cg placards could be important if the trend continues at lower Mach numbers. Testing on later
flights, where the elevon will be scheduled with more negative settings, will provide the
necessary data to determine Shuttle cg impacts. This example points out the importance of
obtaining derivative sensitivities to elevon and angle of attack profiles. Between Mach 2 and 1
(figure 22) the flight values of roll due to aileron are shown to be less effective than
predicted. In this region the elevon has been above O o deflection due to overshooting the elevon
schedule. Because there has been no spread in the elevon deflections on flights 1 to 4, it is not
yet possible to attribute this anomaly to effectivness due to elevon position. Later flights will
provide the spread necessary to determine this function.
The most significant updates in stability and control aerodynamics are the assessment values
and new uncertainties for yaw jet effectiveness. Figures 23 and 24 show very consistent flight
test results for RCS yaw jet effectiveness. After STS-4 sufficient data was available to update
nominal values and reduce	 RCS jet effectiveness uncertainties from early entry through Mach 1,
where the yaw jets are turned off. The jets were shown to be more effective than predicted.
These results have had a significant effect on cg expansion.
CENTER OF GRAVITY EXPANSION
The primary goal of the entire data extraction effort is to open cg placards for the Shuttle,
so that the full payload carrying capability can be utilized. Through the planned maneuvers, and
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elevon and angle of attack schedules, sufficient data is to be obtained to verify the Shuttle
operational safety during entry. The operational limits for cg have been specified to be from 65
to 67.5 percent of the reference body length. This represents a cg travel of 32.32 inches. It is
the goal of the test program to relax cg placards to these operational limits. Figure 25 shows
the expansion of the Xcg that has taken place as a result of flight test data from STS-1 thru -4.
Opening of the aft cg boundary as well as initial opening of the forward boundary is primarily a
result of the confidence that has been gained in the knowledge of the basic pitching moment of the
vehicle. Pitch jet trim requirements were also determined. The most restrictive boundary is the
forward cg limit, because of the critical potential problem areas between Mach 6 and 1. The most
significant relaxation of this forward boundary occurred because of the yaw jet flight test
results. The more effective jets along with the reduced uncertainties resulted in the change
shown in the placard between STS-5 and -6. This has proved the safety of flying payloads planned
for STS-7 and -9. Also shown in figure 25 are aft cg flight test limits, which must be honored in
order to fly the elevon schedules planned for these flights. Relaxation of the boundary to the
full forward limit of 65 percent body length will occur as a result of decreases in other
stability and control derivative uncertainties by the end of the flight test program.
Optimistically these data will prove that predicted potential control problems do not exist.
CONCLUSIONS
The successful flight of STS-1 in April 1981 proved that the challenge of the FCS design and
verification has been met. The flight test data so far is indicating that the aerodynamic
variations were not overly conservative, but are representative of the actual differences
experienced in most of the aerodynamic coefficients at some point during reentry. The successful
extraction of flight test data from the first four flights is proving that the challenge of
developing an operational vehicle with a minimum flight test program is being successfully met.
The placards on the orbiter during entry are to be reduced after 17 flights based on high
quality data from carefully designed manevuers. The approach is optimistic and ambitious but
every effort is being made to insure its success through careful maneuver design, quality data and
safety analysis. The experience gained and techniques employed in the Shuttle program are
applicable to future flight test planning in programs where testing must be limited due to time
constraints or expense.
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TABLE 1 ORBITER CORRELATION APPLICABILITY (REFERENCE 2)
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Figure 18
FLIGHT TEST ANGLE OF ATTACK PROFILES
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Figure 17
SPEEDBRAKE SCHEDULE FOR TESTING
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